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Abstract
A standard assumption in the economic approach to individual decision making
is that people have independent preferences, that is, they care only about their ab-
solute (material) payo¤s. We study equilibria of the classic common pool resource
extraction and public good games when some of the players have negatively interde-
pendent preferences (in the sense that they care not only about their absolute payo¤s
but also about their relative payo¤s) while the remainder have independent prefer-
ences. It is shown that at any equilibrium, those with interdependent preferences earn
strictly higher absolute payo¤s than do players with independent preferences. If the
population composition evolves in accordance with any payo¤ monotonic evolutionary
selection dynamics, then all players will have interdependent preferences in the long
run. Similar (but weaker) results obtain for some other economically important classes
of games in strategic form. The robustness of our …ndings with respect to other prefer-
ence formation mechanisms such as myopic and rational socialization is also discussed.
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A standard assumption in the economic modeling of human behavior is that people have
independent preferences. Given a choice between two income distributions, they will prefer
that in which their own income is higher, regardless of their rank or relative standing in
the two distributions. Changes in the incomes of others, provided that their own material
circumstances remain unchanged, leave them neither better nor worse o¤, and they are
consequently unwilling to sacri…ce any portion of their own material well-being in order to
enhance or to diminish the well being of others.
The usual methodological defence of independent preferences is made on evolutionary
grounds: unitswhich maximize theirown material payo¤s will prosperand thrive, while those
that do not will be outperformed and driven to eventual extinction (Friedman, 1953). This
evolutionary argument is compelling in the context of perfectly competitive environments,
in which individual units are powerless to a¤ect the payo¤s of other units. However, in
strategic settings in which a …nite group of individuals interact, the evolutionary argument
is by no means self-evident. It is at least conceivable that in some strategic environments,
individuals who care about their relative payo¤s as well as their absolute (material) payo¤s
(that is, in the terminology of the present paper, agents with interdependent preferences)
will have an advantage over those who are concerned exclusively with their absolute payo¤s.
This advantage can then translate, somewhat paradoxically, into higher equilibrium absolute
payo¤s for those who are not absolute payo¤ maximizers. Our purpose in the present paper is
to identify environments of economic importance that give rise to this phenomenon. We …nd
that in a variety of commonly studied settings including common pool resource extraction
and public good games, absolute payo¤ maximizers earn strictly lower absolute payo¤s in
equilibrium than do players with interdependent preferences. We argue that this disparity
in equilibrium payo¤s has far-reaching implications for the theory of preference formation.
There are two quite distinct strands in the existing literature on endogenous preferences.
The evolutionary approach views preference formation as the unplanned outcome of genetic
and/or cultural transmission mechanisms. Transmission may be ‘vertical’, as when children
inherit their preferences directly from their parents, or ‘oblique’, as when they inherit their
preferences through the emulation and imitation of other individuals to whom they are
exposed (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981, Boyd and Richerson, 1985).1 Alternatively,
the rational socialization approach to preference formation is based on the postulate that
altruistic and forward looking parents deliberately inculcate preferences in their children with
1This approach has been applied to explain the evolution of altruism among siblings (Bergstrom, 1995),
time preference (Rogers, 1994), risk-aversion (Rubin and Paul, 1979, Robson, 1996), systematic errors in
expectations (Waldman, 1994), and a variety of other tastes and behavioral traits (Hirshleifer, 1987, Frank,
1987, Hansson and Stuart, 1990, Güth and Yaari, 1992).
2a view to enhancing what they, as parents, perceive to be the children’s future well-being.
Along these lines, Rubin and Somanathan (1996) have recently considered the inculcation
of honesty, and Bisin and Verdier (1996a) the emergence of preferences for social status.
It is typically assumed in the evolutionary approach that the selection dynamics are (ab-
solute) payo¤ monotonic, i.e., higher material payo¤s to a heritable trait typically lead to
more rapid replication of that trait over time. Consequently, our …nding that in a variety of
strategic settings of economic importance, the material rewards to those with interdependent
preferences strictly exceed the rewards to those with independent preferences leads directly
to the implication that evolution will favor the emergence of interdependent preferences.
If the population is initially heterogeneous, our results imply that at least in environments
that are well represented by common property and public good games, any payo¤ monotonic
evolutionary selection dynamics will lead in the long run to a population that consists ex-
clusively of individuals with interdependent preferences. These results are obtained when
each member of the population interacts simultaneously with every other member, which is
the usual assumption in common property and public goods contexts. We also consider the
case in which members of the population interact on the basis of pairwise random matching
to play an arbitrary 2 £ 2 game. Somewhat milder results are obtained in this context,
with a heterogeneous population composition typically prevailing in the long run. Except in
relatively uninteresting cases where cooperative behavior is strictly dominant for all players,
in none of the strategic settings studied in this paper does the evolutionary approach entail
a monomorphic population composed only of agents with independent preferences.
When preferences are acquired as a result of deliberate socialization e¤orts by altruistic,
forward looking parents, the implications of the strategic advantage held by those with
interdependent preferences are less obvious. Even if it is true that at any given population
composition those with interdependent preferences obtain strictly higher material payo¤s,
it may not be in the interest of a forward-looking parent with independent preferences to
inculcate interdependent preferences in her child. The reason is that such an act would alter
the population composition and induce a di¤erent equilibrium in the subsequent generation,
and although the child at this equilibrium would do better than those with independent
preferences, this payo¤ may be less in absolute terms than that which could have been
earned had the child been inculcated with independent preferences. Intuitively, there are
e¢ciency losses associated with the inculcation of interdependent preferences, and if these
are su¢ciently large, such inculcation may lead to a decline in absolute payo¤s despite the
increase in relative standing in the society. In spite of this complication, we show that in
some common pool resource extraction and public good games, socialization by forward-
looking parents also leads in the long run to a uniform population in which all individuals
have interdependent preferences.
3The general problem of preference formation can, of course, be studied within the context
of any strategic environment. Our focus on the common pool resource extraction and public
good games is motivated by the fact that these environments have been a perennial feature
of human societies from the earliest times. Traditional societies even in the present day rely
heavily on commonly owned …sheries, grazing lands, and forest areas for their subsistence.
Similarly, throughout human history, a large number of essential activities have required
collective action of one kind or another, ranging from the hunting of large animals and
the construction of housing to the provision of irrigation, harvesting, and defence against
encroachment or attack by competing groups. If such environments favor the emergence
of interdependent preferences, then the standard assumption of independent preferences in
economic models should be made with considerably greater caution and circumspection.2
2 An Analytical Framework
Consider an overlapping generations economy in which each person lives for two periods,
and has some …nite (possibly zero) number of children in the second period of her life. Let
Nt denote the size of the adult population in period t. In the …rst period of their lives,
preferences are acquired in a manner that is left unspeci…ed for the moment. In the second
period of life, the adult members of the population interact with one another in a manner
that we represent by a symmetric strategic form game with complete information.3 Each
adult i selects an action xi from a given set of available actions A. The resulting action
pro…le x = (x1;x2;:::;xN) then determines the absolute payo¤s ¼i(x) ¸ 0 obtained by each
adult. The adult population in any given generation consists of two distinct groups, which
are heterogeneous with respect to their preferences over payo¤ distributions. A number
kt 2 f1;2;:::;Nt ¡ 1g of individuals are absolute payo¤ maximizers in the standard sense;
they are said to be independent agents. These individuals always prefer payo¤ distributions
in which their own material payo¤ is higher, and are left una¤ected by changes in the payo¤s
2The importance and plausibility of interdependent preferences has, of course, been noted in the liter-
ature (Duesenberry, 1949, Easterlin, 1974, Frank, 1987, and Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite, 1992), and is
supported by ample empirical and experimental evidence (see Tomes, 1986, Clark and Oswald, 1996, Saijo
and Nakamura, 1995, Levine, 1996, and references cited therein). It is also well known that the introduction
of interdependent preferences into economic models has non-trivial implications in that many conventional
results have been either overturned or signi…cantly modi…ed in the presence of such preferences (see, among
others, Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978, Oswald, 1983, Frank, 1984, Akerlof and Yellen, 1990, and Ito, Saijo
and Une, 1995). However, to the best of our knowledge, the existing literature falls short of providing an
analysis of the evolution of interdependent preferences.
3The symmetry postulate is very common in evolutionary approaches to economics and, as will become
apparent shortly, it is particularly reasonable in our context. The assumption of complete information is, on
the other hand, much more problematic, and will be relaxed in future work.
4of others. The remainder of the population consists of individuals who are concerned not
only with the value of their absolute payo¤ but also with their payo¤ relative to the average
payo¤ in the population. We say that these individuals have (negatively) interdependent







; i 2 fkt + 1;:::;Ntg (1)
where F is an arbitrary strictly increasing function on R2 and ¹ ¼(x) is the mean payo¤ at
the outcome x in the population at large. (We refer to such individuals in the sequel simply
as interdependent.) This way of representing the (negatively) interdependent preferences
has recently been proposed and axiomatically characterized by Ok and Koçkesen (1997). In
particular, the preferences represented by (1) can be interpreted as a compromise between the
standard case where the individual is assumed to care only about her absolute payo¤ ¼i, and
the extreme case where she is concerned exclusively with her relative payo¤ in the game,
i.e., with ¼i=¹ ¼ (the latter case corresponds to Duesenberry’s relative income hypothesis.)
The analysis of the present paper is conducted in terms of an essentially arbitrary strictly
increasing F function. Thus the class of interdependent preferences we consider here is quite
rich, and incudes great many speci…cations used elsewhere.4
Given the formulation above, the actual strategic interactions of the individuals in period
t are modeled by the normal form game where the ith player’s action space is A and her
objective function is either ¼i (if i 2 f1;:::;ktg) or pi (if i 2 fkt + 1;:::;Ntg). Let us denote
a generic game of this sort by G(kt;Nt):5 An equilibrium of this game is an action pro…le
at which, given their preferences, no player has an incentive to deviate. Formally, at any
equilibrium action pro…le ^ x in period t;
¼i(^ x) ¸ ¼i(yi; ^ x¡i) for all i 2 f1;:::;ktg (2)
and
pi(^ x) ¸ pi(yi; ^ x¡i) for all i 2 fkt + 1;:::;Ntg (3)
for all yi 2 A; where ^ x¡i represents the actions of all players other than player i at action
pro…le ^ x.6 Given a game G(kt;Nt), let the set of Nash equilibrium action pro…les be de-
noted by NE(kt;Nt). The …rst question of interest is the following: are there economically
4One interesting special case of our speci…cation is the objective function pi = ¼i(¼i=¹ ¼)µ where µ ¸ 0
can be interpreted as the degree of interdependence; see Ok and Koçkesen (1997) for a detailed discussion
of individual preferences that can be represented by objective functions of form (1). Moreover, we note that
the entirety of our …ndings would remain intact under an even more general class of functional forms where
pi = Fi(¼i;¼i=¹ ¼) with Fi not necessarily equal to Fj; i 6= j:
5Of course, even when kt; Nt and ¼is are speci…ed, the game is not completely determined due to its
parametric dependence on the function F: For simplicity, however, we do not use a notation that makes this
dependence explicit.
6As usual, (yi;x¡i) 2 RN stands for the vector (x1;:::;xi¡1;yi;xi+1;:::;xN):
5important classes of games for which, at any population composition and size (kt;Nt), and
any equilibrium action pro…le ^ x 2 NE(kt;Nt), the absolute payo¤ to each player with inter-
dependent preferences exceeds the payo¤ to any player with independent preferences? We
shall give an a¢rmative answer to this question in Section 3 where we demonstrate that
two widely studied models, the common pool resource and public good games, yield this
inequality strictly under very general conditions. In other words, at any equilibrium of these
games, the worst performing player with interdependent preferences (who obviously does
not target the maximization of absolute payo¤s) obtains an absolute payo¤ that is strictly
higher than that of the best performing player with independent preferences.
This observation has interesting implications for the theory of preference formation. Con-
sider …rst the case in which preferences are acquired by children directly from their parents,
either by imitation and emulation within the home, or by genetic transmission. In this case
the population composition will evolve on the basis of di¤erences in the number of surviving
children across the two groups of individuals, which in turn are likely to depend on mate-
rial payo¤s in a systematic way. If the dynamics of the population composition are payo¤
monotonic, as is commonly assumed, the …nding that agents with interdependent preferences
obtain higher material payo¤s than do independent players in a variety of economic envi-
ronments will imply a long run population composition in which some, if not all, individuals
have interdependent preferences. These implications are derived and discussed in Section 4.
Alternatively, preference acquisition may be a result of conscious socialization e¤orts on
the part of parents. In this case, children may have preferences that di¤er from those of their
parents, if parents consider it best for the child to be inculcated with preferences other than
their own. Parents may socialize their children on the basis of the payo¤s received in the
current generation, or they may be forward-looking, taking full account of the e¤ects of their
own actions on the population composition in the subsequent generation. This speci…cation
may result in population dynamics that di¤er from those that obtain under evolution. The
implications of parental socialization are discussed in Section 5, where it is shown that at least
for some common pool resource and public goods environments, all parents will inculcate
interdependent preferences in their children.
We now turn to examining the nature of equilibria in a number of strategic environments
(of the sort described above) for a given population composition and size.
63 Strategic Environments
3.1 Common Pool Resource Extraction
The following model of common pool resource extraction (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979) has been
in widespread use for some time. Consider a population consisting of N individuals, each of
whom has access to a common pool resource. Let xi ¸ 0 denote the extraction e¤ort chosen
by individual i, while X =
P
xi denotes the aggregate extraction e¤ort. Total product is
given by a di¤erentiable real function f such that f0 > 0 and f00 < 0: It is natural to assume
that f(0) = 0, so without extractive e¤ort there is no product. There is an opportunity cost
w ¸ 0 per unit of extractive e¤ort and each member of the population receives a share of
the total product that is proportional to her share of aggregate extractive e¤ort. The value,
to the individual, of a unit of the resulting product is given by a nonnegative function P; of




P(f(X))f(X) ¡xiw = xi(R(X) ¡ w) (4)
where R(X) = P(f(X))f(X)=X denotes the average value of the extraction e¤ort and
x 2 RN
+ is the vector of extraction e¤orts.7 To guarantee an interior solution, we shall assume
throughout that f is bounded from above (otherwise equilibrium extractive e¤ort would be
unbounded), and that P(0)f0(0) > w (otherwise no extraction would occur in equilibrium).
As is well known, if all players are payo¤ maximizers with independent preferences, then the
equilibrium vector of extraction e¤ort is unique, interior, symmetric, and ine¢cient.
Rather than assuming that all agents who have access to the common pool resource are
concerned only with the maximization of their absolute payo¤s, we consider the following
scenario. Of the N members of the population, k 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g are standard payo¤
maximizers with independent preferences. The remainder have interdependent preferences,
and are concerned with their relative as well as absolute payo¤s. Speci…cally, a player
i 2 fk + 1;:::;Ng seeks to maximize a payo¤ function pi of the following form:
pi =
(
F(¼i;¼i=¹ ¼); if ¼i 6= 0
F(0;0) if ¼i = 0
(5)
7The above formulation, which closely follows Cornes, Mason and Sandler (1986), is general enough to
encompass a variety of institutional settings. For instance, if the output is for agents’ own use and a labor
market does not exist (as in pre-market societies) one would interpret w as the opportunity cost of the
extraction e¤ort in terms of other useful activities and P as the intrinsic value of the good for the individual.
If, on the other hand, the good is exchanged or sold in a market and a labor market exists (as in contemporary
societies), w can be interpreted as the foregone outside wage and P as the price of the product. In the latter
case, if the output market is perfectly competitive P is a constant function, whereas if it is imperfectly
competitive P represents a downward sloping inverse demand function.
7F : R2 ! R is any di¤erentiable function with F1;F2 > 0:8 Furthermore, we assume that F
satis…es the following natural boundary condition: for any z1;z2 2 R;
F(0;z1) > F(z;z2) whenever z < 0: (6)
That is, an agent with interdependent preferences becomes concerned with her relative payo¤
only when her absolute payo¤ is positive; indeed the relative payo¤ concept runs into obvious
di¢culties when the absolute payo¤s are negative (While (6) is quite reasonable, we will
require it to hold only in the present section.)
Henceforth, we shall refer to the strategic form game de…ned above as a common pool
resource game. An equilibrium of this game is an action pro…le x which satis…es, for any
y 2 R+, the conditions (2) and (3) (with k = kt and N = Nt): Our main question can
then be stated as follows. In a given equilibrium of a common pool resource game, which
of the two groups has a higher average absolute payo¤? The following result provides an
unambiguous answer to this question.9
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium of any common pool resource game, absolute payo¤ max-
imizing individuals obtain strictly lower absolute payo¤s than do individuals who have inter-
dependent preferences.
To illustrate the intuition behind this proposition, we plot in Figure 1 the reaction curves for
independent and interdependent players in a two player commons game with the independent
and interdependent payo¤ functions given by ¼i(x) = xi(1¡X) and pi = ¼2
i=¹ ¼; respectively.10
If both of the players had independent preferences, the unique equilibrium of the game
(represented by point b in Figure 1) would be symmetric where both players choose the
action 0:33: However, player 2’s reaction curve when she has interdependent preferences
is everywhere above the one she would have, had she possessed independent preferences.
Consequently, she chooses a higher action and hence obtains a higher payo¤ than does the
…rst player at the new equilibrium (point a in Figure 1).
The main driving force behind this result appearsto be the potential value of commitment
in strategic environments. In this particular case, the commitment by the interdependent
player arises out of her concern about the share of the aggregate payo¤ she obtains. Conse-
quently, she is willing to extract more of the common resource at every choice of extraction
level by the independent player (player 1), even if that means a reduction in the absolute
8We use the convention of setting pi(x) = F(0;0) whenever ¼i(x) = 0 to avoid the di¢culty of evaluating
indeterminate form 0
0:
9All proofs which do not appear in the main text are found in the appendix.
10We thus choose w = 1; F(t1;t2) = t1t2;and P(t) = 1 for all t1;t2;t ¸ 0; and f(X) = 2X ¡ X2 for
X 2 [0;1] and f(X) = 1 for X ¸ 1: (The violation of the assumption that f0 > 0 everywhere is readily
observed to be inconsequential.)
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Figure 1: A Two Player Common Pool Resource Game
payo¤s she would receive. The best response of player 1 who knows the behavioral disposi-
tion of the interdependent player leads us to an asymmetric equilibrium at which she chooses
a strictly lower extraction e¤ort than that of player 2. Given the structure of ¼i; this leads
to a higher level of absolute payo¤ for the interdependent player than for the independent
player.11
3.2 Private Provision of Public Goods
In this section, we examine interdependent preferences within the context of the private
provision of a public good (cf. Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986, and Cornes and Sandler,
1996). This model is widely used in studying the infamous “free rider” problem, and is one
of the major workhorses in the …eld of public economics.
Consider an N-person economy in which there is one public good the quantity of which
is denoted by X; and one private good which is interpreted as a Hicksian composite good.
For the purposes of symmetry, we assume that each individual is endowed with an identical
level of private good denoted by ! > 0: The preferences of individuals are represented by
a twice di¤erentiable utility function U on R2
+ such that U1 > 0; U2 > 0; U11 · 0; and
11One possible extension of this analysis would be to examine the strategic advantage of interdependent
preferences in common pool resource games where individuals can engage in costly sanctions against other
players once extraction levels have been observed. Such sanctions are an important and prevalent feature of




xi represent the sum of the individual contributions, where xi 2 [0;!] stands
for the contribution of individual i: It is commonplace to postulate that the quantity of
public good is de…ned as the sum of (voluntary) contributions of individuals which are paid
out of their endowments. However, this production technology is not su¢ciently general to
cover the wide variety of collective choice problems with which societies have historically
been confronted. For instance, as noted by a number of authors, if X stands for the protec-
tion of a military front, it seems more reasonable that the technology should be modelled
as X = minfx1;:::;xNg (the so-called weakest-link technology, cf. Hirshleifer, 1983).13 Since
we wish to incorporate here a su¢ciently general public good provision model that would
include examples like the provision of irrigation and national defence (which are all signi…-
cant collective action problems that may well have contributed to the shaping of individual
preferences through evolution), we consider a broader class of technologies than the usual
summation technology. Following Cornes (1993), therefore, we postulate that the public









for some ½ · 1:
This speci…cation incorporates all public goods which can be produced by a technology that







If she contributes xi to the production of the public good, individual i would clearly be
left with an amount ci = ! ¡ xi of the private good. We may, therefore, write the absolute
payo¤ of person i as a function of the pro…le of the contributions as follows:









As in the previous subsection, we shall assume in what follows that only a certain number
k 2 f1;:::;N ¡1g of the individuals recognize ¼i as their objective function. The rest of the
12Since the present study is concerned with material payo¤s, we interpret U as a money metric utility
function in what follows. All of the assumed regularity conditions are standard (with the possible exception
of U12 ¸ 0). Among the examples of commonly used functional forms for U that satisfy these postulates
are U(c;X) = c®X¯; U(c;X) = cV (X) and U(c;X) = c® + V (X) where 0 < ® · 1; ¯ > 0; and V is a
di¤erentiable real function on R+ such that V 0 > 0:
13As noted by Cornes and Sandler (1996, p. 55), “the Allied defenses in 1940 were only as strong as
their weakest point, the Maginot line.” For other interesting collective action problems which necessitate
a di¤erent public good production technology than that which is usually assumed, we refer the reader to
Hirshleifer (1983), Cornes (1993), and Cornes and Sandler (1996).
10society targets the maximization of an objective function which is de…ned by (1) for some





U(! ¡ xi;X):) In what follows, we shall refer to the resulting class of strategic
form games as public good games.
De…ning the notion of equilibrium again via (2) and (3), we now ask the same question
we asked in the previous section, this time for public good games. How do the absolute
payo¤s of the individuals, as de…ned by (7), compare in the equilibrium? The answer is
again unambiguous:
11Proposition 2 In any interior equilibrium of any public good game, absolute payo¤ max-
imizing individuals obtain strictly lower absolute payo¤s than do individuals with interde-
pendent preferences. In any boundary equilibrium of any public good game, all independent
agents obtain (weakly) lower payo¤s than all interdependent agents, and if limX!0U2(!;X) >
U1(!;0), then at least one independent agent obtains a strictly lower payo¤ than all interde-
pendent agents.
The intuition behind this result is similar to that discussed in the common pool resource
game. Here, a concern about one’s relative payo¤ shifts the reaction curve inward and
leads to a lower equilibrium contribution for the interdependent player as compared to the
contribution of the independent player. Although the mechanisms through which the in-
terdependent player obtains a higher payo¤ than does the independent player are di¤erent
in the two games, both are the result of the strategic advantage an interdependent player
derives from her particular behavioral disposition.
3.3 Other Strategic Environments
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we have considered games in which strategic interaction of the agents
takes place at the population-wide level: each member of the population interacts simul-
taneously with every other member and is thereby ‘playing the …eld.’ An alternative and
commonly used speci…cation is that of ‘pairwise contests,’ in which members of the popula-
tion are randomly matched in pairs to play a 2 £ 2 game. As a prelude to the evolutionary
analysis of such environments, we provide an exhaustive analysis in this section of all sym-
metric 2 £ 2 games in which one of the players has independent preferences while the other
has interdependent preferences.14
Take any symmetric 2 £ 2 game where the action space of both individuals is fH;Dg:
The (absolute) payo¤ bimatrix of such a game must necessarily be of the form portrayed in
Table 1.
Player 2




14Güth and Yaari (1992), whose focus is on the evolution of reciprocity, conduct a similar analysis for a
particular class of 2 £ 2 games.
12Since the game at hand is a two-person game, the only non-degenerate case of interest is when
one of the agents, say player 1, is independent, and the other (i.e. player 2) is interdependent.
Consequently, by (1), the game that is actually played between the agents is the one reported
in Table 2, where F is any strictly increasing function. Once again, the question we ask is:
how do the absolute payo¤s of the players (reported in Table 1) fare given that they are in
fact playing the game depicted in Table 2?
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To address this question, we shall use the following well-known classi…cation of symmetric
2 £ 2 games (Weibull, 1995, pp. 28–30).
Category I: (a < c and b < d) or (a > c and b > d)
Category II: a > c and b < d
Category III: a < c and b > d
These categories exhaust all generic examples of symmetric 2 £ 2 games. For instance, the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, coordination games (e.g. Stag Hunt), and the Hawk-Dove game belong
to categories I, II and III, respectively. In what follows, by a game of type i; we mean a game
represented by the payo¤ bimatrix of Table 2 (for some strictly increasing F), provided that
the corresponding game of the form given in Table 1 belongs to category i; i = I, II, III.
The set of all games of type I, II and III is quite rich, and contains games with remarkably
di¤erent inherent structures. Consequently, it is not surprising that one cannot obtain exact
analogues of Propositions 1 and 2 for the class of all such games. Nevertheless, it is possible
to show that interdependent agents still hold the upper hand against independent agents in
the majority of such games. Indeed, it turns out that in any game of type I, II or III, there
exists an equilibrium (de…ned by (2) and (3)) at which the interdependent player obtains at
least as much absolute payo¤ as the independent agent. Moreover, if there exists a unique
asymmetric equilibrium in any such game, then at that equilibrium the level of absolute
payo¤ of interdependent player 2 must strictly exceed that of player 1. More precisely, we
have the following:
13Proposition 3 (a) In any game of type I, either (D;D) (or (H;H)) is the unique equilib-
rium, or there exists another unique equilibrium at which the interdependent agent obtains
strictly higher absolute payo¤s than the independent agent.
(b) Any game of type II is degenerate in the sense that at any equilibrium of any such
game the absolute payo¤s of the interdependent and independent agent are the same.15
(c) In any game of type III, either (H;D) and (D;H) are both equilibrium outcomes, or
the equilibrium is unique and the interdependent agent obtains strictly higher absolute payo¤
than the independent agent in this equilibrium.
Proof To see part (a), take any game of type I in which a < c and b < d; and assume that





which implies that c < b since F is strictly increasing in both of its arguments. But given
that a < c < b; it is immediately observed that (D;H) is the only pure strategy Nash
equilibrium of the game at hand, and we have ¼2(D;H) = b > c = ¼1(D;H): (The case
where a > c and b > d is analyzed analogously.)
To see part (b), take any game of type II, and assume that (H;H) is not an equilibrium.
Since a > c in this case, we must then have 1 < 2c=(b + c): But then 1 > 2b=(b + c); and
hence (D;D) must be an equilibrium.
Finally, to prove part (c), take any game of type III, and assume that either (H;D) or
(D;H) is not an equilibrium. W.l.o.g., let us assume that (H;D) is not an equilibrium. But
then we readily obtain that 2c=(b + c) < 1 so that b > c: This, in turn, guarantees that
(D;H) is the unique equilibrium, and we are done. QED
The potential value of commitment once again appears to be the driving force behind
Proposition 3. This is particularly clear for Proposition 3c which covers the Hawk-Dove
game (in which a < c < d < b); if the di¤erence between absolute payo¤s to playing hawk
against dove and dove against hawk (i.e. between b and c in Table 1) is large enough, playing
H becomes a dominant strategy for the interdependent player so that she credibly commits
to hawkish behavior. The best that the independent player can do in response is then to
retreat to dove-like behavior.16
This completes our static analysis of the potential strategic advantages of interdependent
preferences. The implications of our results for the dynamics of the population composition
15Interestingly, if we consider the mixed strategy extension of games of type II, this category too ceases to
be degenerate. Indeed, one can show that if an interior mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a game of type
II exists, at this equilibrium the expected absolute payo¤ of player 2 is strictly higher than that of player
1. Since we focus on pure strategies in this paper, we omit the proof of this assertion which is of course
available from the authors upon request.
16For a detailed discussion of the motivation for and properties of the Hawk-Dove game, see Maynard
Smith (1982).
14are explored in the sections to follow.
4 Preference Evolution
We consider in this section a model of preference evolution based on vertical transmission:
children inherit the preferences of their parents and the population composition evolves in
accordance with an absolute payo¤ monotonic evolutionary selection dynamic.
4.1 Playing the Field
First consider the case in which the preferences of children are identical to those of their
parents. This could occur either because preferences are transmitted genetically or, more
plausibly, through ‘vertical’ cultural transmission as children observe and emulate their par-
ents. Under this mechanism, it is assumed that any conscious e¤orts on the part of parents
to inculcate preferences in their children are motivated only by a desire to raise their children
to be like themselves, and not with a view to engineering their children’s preferences in order
to enhance their prospective well-being in the subsequent period.
The principal ingredient of analysis is the assumption that the number of surviving
children that each parent leaves behind is an increasing function of the material payo¤s that
they earn in their adult life. This is a common assumption in evolutionary models in general
(see, for instance, Rubin and Paul, 1979 and Robson, 1996). The argument is that greater
access to resources gives rise to a larger number of mates and a higher probability of survival
to maturity, thereby resulting in greater number of surviving children (Waldman, 1994, p.
489).17
We begin by assuming that, during any period t, the population composition and size
(kt;Nt) is historically determined, and a particular game G(kt;Nt) is played. Suppose that
the adult members of the population locate an equilibrium action pro…le ^ xt 2 NE(kt;Nt)
and receive their corresponding payo¤s. Propositions 1 and 2 imply that for any common
property and public good games, regardless of which equilibrium is played, and regardless of
the population composition and size in period t, we have ¼j(^ xt) ¸ (>) ¼i(^ xt) for all (some)
i 2 f1;:::;ktg and all j 2 fkt + 1;:::;Ntg. That is, in such games, any individual with
17It is interesting to note that the classical theory of wages developed by Adam Smith, Malthus and Ricardo
was based on the postulate, considered self-evident only a century and a half ago, that increases in incomes
would, by lowering infant mortality rates, give rise to an increase in population growth and eventually in
labor supply: “poverty, though it does not prevent the generation, is extremely unfavorable to the rearing
of children. The tender plant is produced, but in so cold a soil, and so severe a climate, soon withers and
dies. It is not uncommon, I have been frequently told, in the Highlands of Scotland for a mother who has
borne twenty children not to have two alive.” (Smith, 1776, p. 88)
15interdependent preferences earns a greater material payo¤ than at least one independent
player, and no less than any of them. If the number of surviving children of each adult is
a strictly increasing function of material payo¤s, then the population composition in the
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which in turn yields st+1 < st. Hence, as long as kt > 0, the population share of those
with independent preferences will decline monotonically. If, in addition, there is some upper
bound which the total population cannot exceed, then we can say more:
Proposition 4 Consider any common pool resource or public good game, and suppose that
there is an upper bound which the total population cannot exceed in any generation. For
any given initial population composition and size (k0;N0) such that k0 2 f0;:::;N0 ¡1g, any
(absolute) payo¤ monotonic dynamics with vertical transmission entails that the population
consists exclusively of interdependent agents after …nitely many generations.
The above result hinges on the assumption that the number of surviving o¤spring increases
with material well-being. It must be noted that this assumption appears less innocuous in
view of the demographic changes that have taken place over the past century. Signi…cant
improvements in public health and widespread immunizations have led to a decline in death
rates among the poor, while the spread of contraceptive practices among the more a-uent
has allowed their birth rates to fall. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that so short a period of time
would have signi…cantly altered the distribution of preferences in the population as it existed
prior to these demographic changes. Furthermore, as we shall see in Section 5.1, taking into
account the possibility of (myopic) parental socialization allows us to make a case for the
emergence and persistence of interdependent preferences that does not rely on di¤erential
rates of population growth.
4.2 Pairwise Contests
We now turn to the analysis of symmetric 2£2 games within the con…nes of (absolute) payo¤
monotonic dynamics with vertical cultural transmission. Since there are quite a number of
distinct games in this class, here we shall focus only on one particularly interesting subclass
16of symmetric 2£2 games, namely on games of Hawk-Dove type. The corresponding results
for other sorts of symmetric 2 £ 2 games will only be mentioned brie‡y.
The evolutionary scenariothat we describe in this subsection is that of “pairwise contests”
wherein we assume that population is …nite but large, and that each individual is randomly
matched with another member of this society in order to play a certain game. Three types
of possible pairings are possible: both players independent, both interdependent, and one
player of each type. Given the population composition and size (kt;Nt) in period t, the
probabilities of being matched with an independent or interdependent type are objectively
determined for each player. Furthermore, corresponding to each of the three types of pairings
is a set of equilibria; we assume that players are able to coordinate on one of these. The
manner in which players solve the equilibrium selection problem is not addressed, and the
results that we report do not depend on the choice of any particular equilibrium. Given
the choice of equilibria, the expected (absolute) payo¤ to each type of agent, and the mean
expected (absolute) payo¤ in the population at large are determined as functions of the
population composition st = kt=Nt. Let ¼indep(st) and ¼inter(st) denote the expected average
(absolute) payo¤ of independent and interdependent agents respectively. The dynamics of
the population composition may be represented by a di¤erence equation
st+1 = g (st); (8)
where g : [0;1] ! [0;1] is continuous, and g (st) = st if st 2 f0;1g (a homogeneous population
remains homogeneous.) It is assumed, as before, that the dynamics are payo¤ monotonic,
so for st 2 (0;1), we have
¼indep(st) R ¼inter(st) if and only if g (st) R st:
Finally, we make the unrestrictive assumption that if st 2 (0;1), then g (st) 2 (0;1). This
states simply that the population composition cannot jump in a single generation from an
interior to a boundary point, though of course it can converge asymptotically to one of the
boundaries. Note that in order for an interior state s 2 (0;1) to be a rest point of the above
dynamics, the expected payo¤s of the two player types must be equal.
Given this evolutionary setting, we wish to study games of Hawk-Dove variety, that is,
those 2 £ 2 games represented in Table 1 with a < c < b < d. Recall that when both
players are independent, this game has two pure strategy equilibria f(H;D);(D;H)g. If
both of these pro…les remain equilibria when one (or both) of the players is interdependent,
there is nothing we can say about the long run population composition without addressing
explicitly the issue of equilibrium selection. Although it is unambiguously clear that, in
pairwise contests involving only independent or only interdependent agents, the average
payo¤ accruing to the players will be (b+c)=2, this is not the case in contests involving both
17types of players due to the presence of multiple equilibria. Therefore, we are not able to rank
the average payo¤s obtained by independent and interdependent types in an unambiguous
way, and hence cannot derive de…nitive resultsregarding the long run population composition
in this case.
A more interesting case obtains if the interdependent behavior of an agent alters the set of
equilibria to the singleton f(D;H)g; which occurs if and only if F(a;1) > F (c;2c=(b + c));
that is, when player 2 is su¢ciently interdependent. In this case, H is a strictly domi-
nant strategy for interdependent players regardless of whether their opponent is indepen-
dent. Consequently, they reap the bene…ts of their aggressive nature in games they play
against independent players. Yet, when matched against another interdependent agent, an
interdependent player su¤ers, since (H;H) is then the unique equilibrium. As a result, no
monomorphic population of either kind can be stable. A large population that is composed
of only independent agents will be vulnerable to an invasion by a su¢ciently small number of
interdependent mutants, since the likelihood that two interdependent types will be matched
with each other is then negligible. Since a similar reasoning applies to a large population that
is composed of only interdependent agents, we must conclude that both types of individuals
must be present in a society with a stable population composition (if such a composition
exists at all).18 This intuition underlies the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Consider any game of the Hawk-Dove type and any strictly increasing F
with F(a;1) > F (c;2c=(b + c)). Let the population size N be …nite (but large), and consider
the pairwise contests scenario along with an arbitrary (absolute) payo¤ monotonic dynamics
with vertical transmission. For any k0 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g; there exists some strictly positive
number µ such that, except for some …nite number of initial generations, the population
composition contains at least a share µ of each player type.
The above result states that convergence to the boundaries cannot occur under the dynamics
(8). It is amply possible, even for simple speci…cations such as the widely used replicator
dynamics, for stable limit cycles and more complex dynamics to occur in this model so the
population composition may not converge at all. What the result implies, however, is that
if convergence does occur, it will be to an interior state.
Propositions 4 and 5 draw markedly di¤erent pictures of the long run population compo-
sition of the society even though they both use vertical transmission mechanisms and payo¤
18This …nding is very much in the same spirit as that of Banerjee and Weibull (1995), who consider a
population consisting of three types: (irrational) hawks, (irrational) doves, and optimizers, with the latter
playing a best response against whichever opponent they meet. In this setting the only stable composition
is a mixture of hawks and optimizers. Our independent types are identical to Banerjee and Weibull’s
best responders, while the behavior of our interdependent types (if they are su¢ciently interdependent) is
indistinguishable from that of their (irrational) hawks.
18monotonic evolutionary dynamics, and even though the commitment of the interdependent
players always pays o¤ against independent agents in the games under consideration. It
appears therefore that the evolution of preferences is likely to yield di¤erent outcomes un-
der selection dynamics of the playing the …eld variety as compared with dynamics based on
pairwise contests. To reiterate, the main reason behind this di¤erence is that in pairwise
contests it is possible for two interdependent agents to be paired, which may thus result in
absolute payo¤ losses that do not a¤ect the independent players in the society. Therefore,
if the share of interdependent agents in the population increases su¢ciently, the frequency
with which this occurs rises, and thus the expected average payo¤ of the interdependent
types becomes smaller than that of the independent types. This possibility simply does not
exist in the playing the …eld framework, for, at least in common pool resources and public
good games, emergence of a polymorphic population composition always guarantees a higher
absolute payo¤ to all interdependent agents.19
5 Parental Socialization
In this section we consider two models of parental socialization: myopic and “rational”. In
the case of myopic socialization parents attempt to socialize their children on the basis of the
current payo¤distribution, and children are eithersuccessfully socialized orsimply inherit the
preferences of their parents. In the case of forward-looking (rational) socialization, parents
take full account of the e¤ects of their actions on the future population composition.
5.1 Myopic Socialization
In order to examine the e¤ects of myopic socialization, we proceed under the assumption
that each generation has the same population size N and that each adult has exactly one
child. As before, let NE(kt;N) denote the set of Nash equilibria corresponding to the popu-
lation composition and size at time t. Having observed the payo¤ distribution, adults must
decide whether to inculcate independent or interdependent preferences in their children. It
is assumed that parents are altruistic, but that they are able to judge di¤erent payo¤ dis-
tributions only in the light of their own preferences. (Bisin and Verdier, 1996b, refer to this
19In passing, we note how Proposition 5 would be altered, under the basic evolutionary scenario we
examined above, if we replaced the games of Hawk-Dove variety with other symmetric 2 £ 2 games. In
games of Category I, either any initial population composition is stable (as in Prisoner’s Dilemma), or
the population is composed of only independent agents (the latter case being observed only for relatively
uninteresting games where cooperative behavior is strictly dominant strategy for all players.) In Category
II type games, on the other hand, we again face the multiple equilibrium problem and thus are unable to
reach to unambiguous conclusions.
19as partial empathy.) A parent with independent preferences will therefore wish to inculcate
preferences in her child which yield the highest absolute payo¤. A parent with interdepen-
dent preferences, on the other hand, will wish to inculcate preferences in her child which
yield the highest value for the objective function de…ned by (1). Even if parents had static
expectations regarding the behavior of other parents, a forward looking parent who chooses
to instill preferences that di¤er from her own will expect to in‡uence the population com-
position and hence the set of equilibria that will emerge in the subsequent generation. This
complicates the decision problem faced by parents quite substantially, in a manner that is
brie‡y explored in Section 5.2. For the moment, however, suppose that parents ignore this
e¤ect of their actions, and myopically use the current payo¤ distribution to determine which
of the two preference types yields a higher value for their objective function. Propositions
1 and 2 imply that for any common property and public good games, regardless of which
equilibrium is played, and regardless of the population composition and size in period t, we
have ¼j(^ xt) ¸ (>) ¼i(^ xt) for all (some) i 2 f1;:::;ktg and all j 2 fkt +1;:::;Ng. Since inter-
dependent parents obtain greater absolute as well as relative payo¤s than do independent
parents, they will certainly choose to inculcate interdependent preferences in their children.
Independent parents, on the other hand, will choose to inculcate interdependent preferences
in their children, imploring them to “do as I say, not as I do!”
Of course, the parent’s socialization e¤orts may not be successful, in which case we assume
that the child simply inherits her parent’s preferences. Let us assume then that there is an
exogenously given probability, ¾; with which the socialization e¤ort is successful, and refer
to the resulting preference formation mechanism as myopic socialization with probability ¾:
The long run implications of this mechanism can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 6 Fix a population size N ¸ 2; and consider any common pool resource or
public good game. For any given initial number of independent players k0 2 f0;:::;N¡1g, any
myopic socialization mechanism with probability ¾ > 0 entails that the long run population
will be composed entirely of interdependent agents.
We note, however, that if the population initially consists exclusively of independent types,
it will continue to do so in each subsequent generation, for in that case there is no possi-
bility that an independent parent will have an interdependent child. However, if we add
to the model the possibility of errors, trembles, or mutation in the process of preference
adoption, then the resulting stationary distribution will have full support f0;:::Ng, and as
the mutation rate gets vanishingly small, the stationary distribution of the process converges
(with probability 1) to the homogeneous distribution which is again comprised of only the
interdependent agents.20
20For brevity, we omit the proof of this assertion which is available upon request. The issue at hand is
20Finally, we consider the games of the Hawk-Dove type in the light of the present myopic
socialization mechanism. Given Proposition 5, the following observation is not surprising:
Proposition 7 Consider any game of the Hawk-Dove type and any strictly increasing F
with F(a;1) > F (c;2c=(b + c)): Let the population size N be …nite (but large), and consider
the pairwise contests scenario along with any myopic socialization mechanism with probability
¾ > 0. For any k0 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g; the expected population share of independent agents in
the long run is strictly smaller than 1, that is, the long run population is polymorphic in
expectation.21
As expected, Propositions 6 and 7 yield di¤erent conjectures for the long run composition
of the society as determined by myopic socialization. Yet, it is striking that in each of
these results (and those of previous section) we …nd no evidence supporting the presence of
populations that are composed entirely of independent agents.
5.2 Rational Socialization
Finally, consider the case in which parents are forward looking and deliberately shape the
preferences of their children in order to increase what they perceive, in the light of their
own preferences, as the child’s well-being. In terms of the framework used here, a rational,
forward-looking parent with independent preferences will choose to inculcate interdependent
preferences in her child if it enhances the child’s absolute payo¤. Similarly, a parent with
interdependent preferences will choose to inculcate independent preferences in her child if,
by doing so, they can induce an action pro…le in the subsequent generation which yields her
child a higher value of the parent’s interdependent objective function.
Since parents are forward looking, the dynamics of the population composition will, in
general, depend on the expectations held by each parent regarding the behavior of other
parents. As before, assume that each parent has only one child, so that the population
is stationary at N. In period t there are kt 2 f1;:::;Ng independent individuals. Denote
by ke
i;t the expectations of parent i in period t regarding the number of other parents who
will socialize their children with independent preferences. In deciding whether to transmit
independent or interdependent preferences to her child, an independent parent i compares
the absolute payo¤ to an independent player in a society with ke
i;t + 1 independent players
with the absolute payo¤ to an interdependent player when there are ke
i;t independent players.
If the latter is higher, then the parent chooses to inculcate interdependent preferences in her
analogous to the double limit problem studied by Young (1993), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), and
Vega-Redondo (1996).
21Of course, if the population is initially composed of only interdependent (independent) agents, so will it
be in every period.
21o¤spring. Similarly, an interdependent parent i compares the interdependent payo¤ to an
independent agent in a society with ke
i;t + 1 independent players with the interdependent
payo¤ to an interdependent agent in a society with ke
i;t independent agents. If the latter is
higher she chooses to inculcate interdependent preferences in her child.
If parents have static expectations regarding the behavior of other parents, then ke
i;t = kt
for all interdependent parents and ke
i;t = kt ¡ 1 for all independent parents. At any steady
state of the dynamics under static expectations, parents’ expectations will be self-ful…lling.
Staticexpectationswill not, however, be self-ful…llingwheneverthepopulation composition is
changing from one period to the next. In this case one might wish to explore the properties of
trajectories along which parents have rational or self-ful…lling expectations at all times. With
rational expectations, the dynamics of the population composition may be indeterminate:
from any initial population composition there may exist multiple paths which satisfy the
parents’ optimality conditions and in which expectations are self-ful…lling. In the case to be
considered below, however, not only is the rational expectations path determinate, it yields
precisely the same trajectory as the hypothesis of static expectations.
When the population size N is large, dynamics under static expectations will be closely
approximated by the dynamics under myopic socialization. The only di¤erence between my-
opic socialization and forward-looking socialization with static expectations is that the latter
requires that parents take into account the possible changes in the population composition
induced by their own socialization e¤orts. Therefore, when the relative share of a single
parent is negligibly small in a population, these two notions of socialization coincide. In
particular, the results one would obtain in terms of myopic and rational socialization with
static expectations would be virtually identical for games of Hawk-Dove variety that are
played in pairwise contests in …nite but large populations. Similarly, Proposition 6 would
remain intact in the present framework if N is su¢ciently large.
If the in‡uence of a single parent on the population composition is not negligible, then it
is conceivable that the implications of rational socialization (with static or rational expecta-
tions) will be substantially di¤erent than those of myopic socialization. Due to the potential
e¢ciency losses induced by the inculcation of interdependent preferences, the absolute payo¤
of an independent individual can be larger than the absolute payo¤ she would have earned
had she acquired interdependent preferences instead, even though it remains true that for
a given population composition, interdependent agents earn greater payo¤s. Consequently,
in small populations, rational socialization may act against the evolutionary forces that fa-
vor the spread of interdependent preferences. We …nd, however, that rational socialization
need not always go against the evolutionary selection processes (such as vertical cultural
transmission) even in small societies. In fact, depending on the particular characteristics of
the strategic environment under consideration, it may well act just like a payo¤ monotonic
22Figure 2: Rational Socialization in the Commons Game
selection dynamics. We conclude the present study with a demonstration of this possibility.
Fix an arbitrary N, and consider the common pool resource game with w = 1, P(z) = 1
for all z ¸ 0, and
f(X) =
(
2X ¡ X2; if 0 · X · 1
1; if X > 1
Therefore, the objective function of an independent agent is ¼i(x) = xi(1 ¡ X) for all
x 2 RN
+; and pi = ¼2
i=¹ ¼ for all i 2 fk + 1;:::;Ng: It is easy to check that the equilibrium of
this game (for any k 2 f0;:::;Ng) is interior and intra-group symmetric (i.e., all independent
(and interdependent) agents choose the same level of extraction e¤ort in the equilibrium).
Unfortunately, the algebra involved in comparing the relevant payo¤s at arbitrary (k;N)
tuples turns out to be quite complicated. Consequently, we have chosen to simulate these
equilibrium payo¤s for a variety of N levels (including 2;3;10;20;50;100). The simulation
results for the case N = 20 are typical and are plotted in Figure 3. The striking observation
is that an independent parent will choose to inculcate interdependent preferences in her child,
regardless of their expectations concerning the behavior of other parents.22 In particular,
22It is enough to analyze the decision making process of only the independent parents because that of
the interdependent parents is symmetrical, i.e., if an independent parent chooses to transmit interdependent
preferences so does an interdependent parent (since domination in absolute payo¤s implies domination in
interdependent payo¤s).
23this occurs under both static and self-ful…lling expectations. As in the case of vertical
cultural transmission, rational socialization too gives rise in this example to a monomorphic
population composed only of interdependent agents. From any initial composition, the
population will become completely interdependent in a single generation.23
6 Conclusions
The …ndings reported in this paper give some support to the hypothesis of interdependent
preferences on theoretical grounds. Our results do not allow us to conclude that interdepen-
dent preferences are the only possible outcome of evolutionary selection, nor do we claim
that independent preferences can never be sustained in evolutionary equilibrium. We do
feel justi…ed in concluding, however, that there are su¢cient theoretical grounds for con-
sidering the hypothesis of negatively interdependent preferences to be an important and
reasonable alternative to the more standard postulate of independent preferences at least in
some economic contexts.
There are a number of directions in which we believe the present research could be fruit-
fully extended. It will be interesting to know the extent to which our results generalize to
include additional, broader classes of games. In Koçkesen, Ok and Sethi (1997) we address
this question for classes of supermodular and submodular games, and provide conditions
under which players with interdependent preferences do no worse (and sometimes better)
than those with independent preferences. One might also investigate how our …ndings would
be modi…ed when the model is extended to include the presence of private information with
respect to the extent of one’s interdependence. Another possible direction for future re-
search pertains to the implications of our results for managerial behavior in oligopolistic
markets. The payo¤ structure in the common pool resource game resembles that in Cournot
oligopoly, and the conditions under which rational socialization predicts the inculcation of
interdependent preferences are likely to be related to those in which a pro…t seeking share-
holder (principal) will instruct the manager (agent) of her …rm to pursue objectives other
than the maximization of absolute pro…ts. This issue has already been explored for duopolis-
tic markets with linear demand by Fershtman and Judd (1987) but our …ndings suggest that
the phenomenon will arise much more generally. A third possible extension involves the
application of the present framework to study certain anomalies frequently observed in ex-
perimental games. It appears particularly well suited to explain behavior in ultimatum
bargaining games, in which a concern for relative standing would predict the rejection of
highly skewed o¤ers and entail fear of retaliation on the part of the …rst movers (cf. Bolton,
23The same result was obtained for a variety of public good games, including the case U(c;X) = cX, and
for several other examples of common pool resource games, details of which are available upon request.
241991, Saijo and Nakamura, 1995, and Levine, 1996). Furthermore, the ultimatum bargain-
ing environment is one in which responders with interdependent preferences will earn higher
payo¤s than those with independent preferences, so that evolution operating in this environ-
ment is likely to select against the latter. These and other questions arising from the present
work are left for future research.
25Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let ^ x 2 RN
+ be an equilibrium of an arbitrary common pool resource game. Strict concavity







< 0 for all X ¸ 0:
Given that P0 · 0; therefore, we have R0 < 0: From this observation, boundedness of f
(which implies that limX!1 f0(X) = 0), and the hypothesis that R(0) = P(0)f0(0) > w; it
follows that there exists a unique Xo > 0 such that R(Xo) Q w whenever X R Xo.
Suppose that ^ X =
P
^ xi ¸ Xo: Then, ^ xi = 0 for all i 2 f1;:::;kg; for otherwise ¼i(^ xi ¡
²; ^ x¡i) > ¼i(^ xi; ^ x¡i) for any ² 2 (0; ^ xi): We next claim that ^ xj = 0 for all j 2 fk + 1;:::;Ng
as well. So, assume for contradiction that ^ xj > 0 for some j 2 fk + 1;:::;Ng: If ^ X > Xo;
then ¼j(^ x) < 0 so that by (5) and (6),







contradicting that ^ x is a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, if ^ X = Xo; then ¼j(^ x) = 0
and we have, by (5),
pj(^ xj ¡ "; ^ x¡j) = F
µ
¼j(^ xj ¡ "; ^ x¡j);
¼j(^ xj ¡ "; ^ x¡j)
¹ ¼(^ xj ¡ "; ^ x¡j)
¶
> F(0;0) = pj(^ x)
for all " 2 (0; ^ xj): (Here the strict inequality follows from the fact that F is strictly in-
creasing.) Therefore, ^ xi = 0 must hold for all i 2 f1;:::;Ng whenever ^ X ¸ Xo; and this
contradicts Xo > 0: We thus conclude that ^ X < Xo holds and we have R( ^ X) > w:
Now pick any i 2 f1;:::;kg and j 2 fk + 1;:::;Ng: Given that ^ X < Xo; it is easily seen
that ^ xi > 0: Thus,
@¼i
@xi
= R( ^ X) ¡w + ^ xiR






























where all the derivatives are evaluated at ^ x: It is easily veri…ed that
P
r6=j @¼r=@xj < 0 and
¼j=
P
¼r · 1: Hence, since F1;F2 > 0, we must have @¼j(^ x)=@xj < 0, that is, R( ^ X) ¡ w +
^ xjR0( ^ X) < 0: Combining this inequality with (9), we obtain
(^ xj ¡ ^ xi)R
0( ^ X) < 0:
The proposition then follows from (4) and the fact that R0 < 0. QED
26Proof of Proposition 2
Let ^ x 2 [0;!]N be an equilibrium of an arbitrary public good game. Proposition 2 is an
immediate consequence of the following two claims.
Claim 1. If there exists a j0 2 fk + 1;:::;Ng such that ^ xj0 > 0; then U(! ¡ ^ xj; ^ X) >
U(! ¡ ^ xi; ^ X) holds for all (i;j) 2 f1;:::;kg £ fk + 1;:::;Ng:
Proof of Claim 1. Note that by (7), we have
@¼i(^ x)
@xi




i + ^ X¡i)
(1=½)¡1U2(! ¡ ^ xi; ^ X)




i)1=½: Now take an arbitrary i 2 f1;:::;kg; and assume that ^ xi < !:
Therefore, @¼i(^ x)=@xi · 0 so that




i + ^ X¡i)
(1=½)¡1U2(! ¡ ^ xi; ^ X) · 0: (10)
(Clearly, strict inequality holds in (10) only if ^ xi = 0.)
Next take any j 2 argmaxj02fk+1;:::;Ng ^ xj0; and note that ^ xj > 0 by hypothesis. Then

























F2 ¸ 0: (11)







r + ^ X¡r)
(1=½)¡1U2(! ¡ ^ xi; ^ X) > 0:
(Notice that ^ x½
r + ^ X¡r > 0; for we have assumed above that ^ xj > 0.) Therefore, (11) implies
that @pj=@xj > 0 so that we have




j + ^ X¡j)
(1=½)¡1U2(! ¡ ^ xj; ^ X) > 0
Combining this inequality with (10) and recalling that ^ x
½
j + ^ X¡j = ^ x
½
i + ^ X¡i, we …nd that
¡U1(! ¡ ^ xj; ^ X) + ^ x
½¡1
j U2(! ¡ ^ xj; ^ X) > ¡U1(! ¡ ^ xi; ^ X) + ^ x
½¡1
i U2(! ¡ ^ xi; ^ X): (12)




j U2(! ¡ ^ xj; ^ X) > ^ x
½¡1
i U2(! ¡ ^ xi; ^ X):
But this is a contradiction, for since ½ · 1 and ^ xj ¸ ^ xi; we must have ^ x
½¡1
j · ^ x
½¡1
i ; and
since U12 ¸ 0; we must have U2(! ¡ ^ xj; ^ X) · U2(! ¡ ^ xi; ^ X): Therefore, we may conclude
that ^ xj < ^ xi for all i 2 f1;:::;kg such that ^ xi < !: But then by the choice of j; it follows
27that ^ xj0 < ^ xi for all i 2 f1;:::;kg and all j0 2 fk + 1;:::;Ng: Claim 1 then follows from the
hypothesis that U1 > 0:
Claim 2. If ^ xj = 0 for all j 2 fk + 1;:::;Ng; then U(! ¡ ^ xj; ^ X) ¸ U(! ¡ ^ xi; ^ X) holds
for all (i;j) 2 f1;:::;kg £ fk + 1;:::;Ng and U(! ¡ ^ xj; ^ X) > U(! ¡ ^ xi; ^ X) for at least one
i 2 f1;:::;kg and all j 2 fk + 1;:::;Ng.
Proof of Claim 2. Given that ^ xj = 0 for all j and U1 > 0; the …rst part of the claim is
obvious. In fact, the payo¤level of any interdependent playerwould then obviously bestrictly
greater than any independent player with ^ xi > 0: But since limX!0U2(!;X) > U1(!;0); we
must have ^ xi > 0 for some i 2 f1;:::;kg; and we are done. QED
Proof of Proposition 4
Letting N¤ stand for an upper bound for Nt; we have






: k 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g
¾
for all t = 0;::: :
Since S is …nite, and st+1 < st whenever st > 0; there must exist a T · #S such that
st = kt = 0 for all t 2 fT;T + 1;:::g: QED
Proof of Proposition 5
By appealing to the assumption of “large” population, we may assume that the probability







+ (1 ¡ st)c and ¼inter(st) = stb + (1 ¡ st)a:
By using payo¤ monotonicity, therefore, we have
¼indep(s) R ¼inter(s) , s Q s
¤ , g(s) R s (13)
where s¤ =
2(c¡a)
b+c¡2a: By using (13), one can easily verify that either s¤ 2 argmaxs2[0;s¤] g(s)
or s¤ 2 argmins2[s¤;1] g(s) implies that limn!1 gn(s) = s¤ for all s 2 (0;1); which in turn

















(see Figure 3). By continuity of g; µ and µ are well-de…ned. Moreover, since g is continuous,
24For any positive integer n; we let gn stand for the nth iterate of g; that is, gn = g ± ¢ ¢ ¢ ± g where the
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Figure 3: Construction of the interval [µ;µ]
g(0) = 0; g(1) = 1 and g(s) 2 (0;1) for all s 2 (0;1); we have 0 < µ < s¤ < µ < 1. Finally,
we de…ne µ = minfµ;1¡µg: Proposition 5 is then an immediate consequence of the following
Claims 2 and 3.
Claim 1. If s 2 (0;s¤); then g(s) < µ; and if s 2 (s¤;1); then g(s) > µ:
Proof of Claim 1. We only prove the …rst assertion, the second one is proved similarly.
Take any s 2 (0;s¤) and suppose that g(s) ¸ µ: Then since g is continuous and g(1) = 1;
the choice of µ implies that g(g(s)) ¸ g(µ) (otherwise, it follows from the intermediate value
theorem that there exists a µ
0 > µ such that g(µ
0) = g(µ)). But since g(s) > s¤ > s; by (13)
and the de…nition of µ;





Claim 2. If s 2 [µ;µ]; then gn(s) 2 (µ;µ) for any positive integer n.
Proof of Claim 2. Let s 2 [µ;s¤): By Claim 1, g(s) < µ and by (13), g(s) > s ¸ µ: The
claim then follows by induction. The case where s 2 (s¤;µ] is established similarly.
Claim 3. For any s 2 (0;µ) [ (µ;1); there exists a positive integer M such that gM(s) 2
(µ;µ).
Proof of Claim 3. W.l.o.g., we only study the case where s 2 (0;µ): Suppose for con-
tradiction that gn(s) · µ for all n ¸ 1: This means that µ is an upper bound for the
sequence gn(s) which is, by (13), strictly increasing. Therefore, there exists an ^ s such that
290 < limn!1 gn(s) = ^ s · µ: But then ^ s must be a …xed point of g; for by continuity of g;











By (1), therefore, µ ¸ ^ s = s¤ > µ; contradiction. Consequently, there exists a positive integer
M such that gM(s) > µ. Let M be the smallest such integer. Then gM¡1(s) 2 (0;s¤); and
by Claim 1, we also have gM(s) < µ: Proof is then complete. QED
Proof of Proposition 6
The myopic socialization with probability ¾ entails the discrete time Markov chain with the
transition matrix - 2 [0;1](N+1)£(N+1) where
-rp = Prob[kt+1 = p j kt = r]
=
8
> > > > > <






(1 ¡ ¾)p¾r¡p; if p · r
0; if p > r
; if r < N
(
1; if r = p
0; if r 6= p
; if r = N:
Let, for any positive integer n; 4n denote the n-dimensional unit simplex (i.e., the set of
all probability distributions on a set of cardinality n), and let ei
n denote the ith unit vector
in 4n: We wish to show that limt!1ei
N+1-t = e1
N+1 for all i 2 f1;:::;Ng: (Notice that e1
N+1
is the degenerate probability distribution that corresponds to the state kt = 0:) Clearly, -
represents a reducible chain with states 0 and N being absorbent. De…ne ^ - 2 [0;1]N£N by
^ -rp = -rp for all r;p 2 f0;:::;N ¡1g: Given that the unique essential class of ^ - is composed
only of the aperiodic state 0, there exists a unique invariant distribution of ^ -:25 But since
^ - is lower triangular, it is easily observed that x^ - = x implies that x = e1
N: So, the unique
stationary distribution of the chain ^ - must be e1









for all x 2 4N; and the proposition follows. QED
Proof of Proposition 7





: Notice that if kt = k¤ (or 0; or N), we have kt = kt+1 = ¢ ¢ ¢ . On the
other hand, if kt > k¤; then the probability of kt+1 > kt is zero, and there is a probabilistic
25State i is essential, if any state j is accessible from i, then i is accessible from j: See Bhattacharya and
Waymire (1990, Theorem 7.1(i), p. 134.)
30tendency for kt to shrink. More precisely, the myopic socialization with probability ¾ yields
the discrete time Markov chain with the transition matrix - 2 [0;1](N+1)£(N+1) where
-rp = Prob[kt+1 = p j kt = r]
=
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <






(1 ¡ ¾)p¾r¡p; if r ¸ p
0; if r < p





(N ¡ p)!(p ¡ r)!
(1 ¡ ¾)N¡p¾p¡r; if r · p
0; if r > p
; if 0 6= r < k¤
(
1; if r = p
0; if r 6= p
; if r 2 f0;k¤;Ng:
(Notice that k¤ may or may not be a state in this chain. W.l.o.g., however, we shall assume
in what follows that it is.)26
Now choose any ei; i = 2 f1;N + 1g: Proposition 7 will be established if we can show that
limt!1ei-t = 2 fe1;eN+1g. If i = k¤ + 1; the claim is trivial, so let i 6= k¤ + 1: Since any
state r is aperiodic (i.e., -rr > 0) and since the mean recurrence rate of state k¤ is 1, by









¤; :::; kt¡1 6= k
¤ and kt = k
¤ j k0 = r]:
That is, limt!1 -t
rk¤ is equal to the probability that the chain ever visits k¤ given that it
starts from r = 2 f0;k¤;Ng: But the latter probability is obviously nonzero since all states
other than 0 and N communicate to k¤: Consequently, the (k¤ + 1)th entry of ei limt!1 -t
is nonzero, and we are done.27 QED
26It is not di¢cult to show that all states of this chain other than 0; k¤ and N are transient. It follows
that if x 2 4N+1 is a stationary distribution, then xi = 0 for all i = 2 f1;k¤ +1;N +1g: Given that 0; k¤ and
N are absorbent states, therefore, cofe1;ek
¤+1;eN+1g is the set of all stationary distributions of -: (Here
co(¢) stands for the convex hull operator, and ei denotes the ith unit vector in 4N+1.)




N ; i.e., k¤ < N ¡ 1; state 0 is accessible from all states other than N: Thus, again by the
generalized ergodic theorem, limt!1 -t
r0 > 0 for all r 6= N: Hence, limt!1 ei-t 6= eN+1: Similarly, one can
show that the invariant distribution of the chain is not equal to e1: (In fact, when k¤ is not a state, we have
limt!1 ei-t 2 int(cofe1;eNg):)
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